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THE REPLEVIN ACT OF 1901
CHAPTER 1.
PREAMBLE AND PURPOSES OF THE ACT
Section 1. The Act of April 19, 1901, P. L. 88 was
enacted for the purpose of "Regulating the Practice in
Cases where the writ of Replevin, is Issued," without interfering with the substantive law of replevin,1 save in so
far as such principle of law is expressly inconsistent with
the provisions of this act.2 It thus becane a complete
code of the practice "Relating to Replevin,"' in every ins[ance where the writ is issued, ' whether it be for the establishment of title to or right of possession of personal
property,' or for documents that my be evidence of such
ownership, 6 but not for documents as evidence of the title
to real estate, 7 though it embraces replevin in disrtess pro'Clark v. McLanahan, 39 Sup. 30 (1909); Comm. to use v. Schsoeder, 18 Dist, 929 (1909).
2
Section XIII. of the Act of 1901.
3
0Ott v. Miller, 16 Dist 140 (1907), 33 Pa. C. C. 304.
4
Games v. Gilder, 10 Lack. Jurist 234 (1909).
!',Rosenfeld v. Goldberg, 14 Dist. 381 (1905).
GReber v. Schroeder, 221 Pa. 152 (1908).
7
Smithson v. Johnson, 23 Dist. 68 (1914), S. C. 71 Leg. Int. 40.
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ceedings;s the ,evident intent o fthe legislature being to
speed the cause generally.'
Section 2. Prior to the Act of 1901, the practiDce of
replevin was governed solely by the Act of 1705 when
title to personal property was involved, or by the Act of
1772 dn proceedings between landlord and terant;0 'but
m many details the procedure was unsettled.
It was
even doubted whether under the Act of 1705, a bond was
necessary with the issuance of the writ of replevin. 2
Neither was the counterbond or old claim property bond
prescribed by statute. 3 But the main deficiencies which
the Legislature intended to remedy were:
1. There was no fixed time within which a forthcoming bond should be filed.
2. There was no certainty as to the condition of
such bond; and
3. There was no provision made for the release of
the sheriff and his sureti'es for taking a replevin bond
which proved insufficient at the time of the rendition of
judgment, through contingencies which -he could not
foresee."'
And as -a remedial statute, the Act of 1901 "is to be
interpreted in such manner as to most effectually accomplish its purpose,"" in which "the previous law, the supopsed evil, the remedy desired, the language of the statute
and the fair and reasonable import thereof must be considered." 10
8
Drumgoole v. Lyle, 30 Sup. 463 (1906); Pickering v. Yeates, 51
Sup. 436 (1912).
9
Greismer v. Hill, 13 Luz. Leg. Reg. 231 (1907). Affirmed in: 225
Pa. 545 (1909).
'LWilliams v. Rutherford, 14 Dist. 282 (1905).
"'Comm. v. Schroeder, Supra Note 1.
12Balsley v. Hoffman, 13 Pa. 606 (1850).
"Chaffee v. Sangston, 10 Watts 265 (1840).
'4Hill v. Mervine (No. 1) 13 Dist. 580 (1904); 29 Pa. C. C. 260.
'"5 Comm. v. Schroeder, Supra Note 1.
I ;Hill v. Mervine (No. 1) Supra Note 14.
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CHAPTER II.
PRAECIPE AND BOND IN REPLEVIN
Section 3. Proceedings in replevin, as all other actions, originate by paintiff's attorney issuing a praecipe or
order, upon the prothonotary of the Common PJeas to issuet this wr t, in which a description of the specific chattels to be replevied is set forth.17 But such description need
not be detailed, it is enough if it permits of a clear idenLification of -the property involved in the suit. 8 And if
the -description be so meagre in its details that the identity
of the specific property cannot be established, any act on
the part of the defendant affirming the replevin proceedings differentiates such property."9
Section 4. With this praecipe the plaintiff, or his
agent, "shall make an affidavit of value of the goods and
chattdis,"' and the filing of record of such affidavit of
value is not a startutory requisite,2" 'as it .;s made by plaintiff merely to determine the amount of bail,23 and an approximate value is sufficient. 4 So where the jury awarded more damages than the plaintiff stipulated in the affidavit of value, the court allowed him to recover the same
because the affidavit of value is not a matter of record but
merey information for the prothonotary."5 Therefore, such
27 Weaver v. Lawrence, 1 Dallas 156 (1790); English v. Dalborw,
1. Miles 160 (1836).
'sSelig Polyscope Co. v. Swaab. 20 Dist. 194 (1911).
19
Ruch v. Morris, 28 Pa. 245 (1857).
20
Nicholl, Atty. v. Abram 7 D. R. 250 (1898), 20 Pa. C. C. 605.

-'Section 8th of the Act of 1901.
-Hill
v. Mervine (No. 2) 13 Dist. 582 (1904), 29 Pa. C. C. 262;
22
Hill v. Mervine (No. 2) 13 Dist. 582 (1904), 29 Pa. C. C. 262;
S. C., 5 Lack. Jur. 182.
23
Hill v. Mervine (No. 2) Supra Note 22; Smith v. Stakulsky, 15
Luz. Leg. Reg. 317 (1910).
2
4Selig Polyscope Co. v. Swaab, Supra Note 18.
25
Di Clemente v. Lustig, 12 Lack. Jur. 231 (1911). And this is
true even where the damages are more than that stipulated in the

declaration.

Fisher v. Whoolery, 25 Pa. 197 (1855).
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affidavit need not contain the stipulation as provided by
Setioln VIII. of the Act of 1901, "which value shall be the
cost to the defendant of replacing them should the issue be
decided in his favor. 20 But the plaintiff is held to the
value in the writ where he sues the sheriff on the latter's
bond for neglect of duty."7
Section 5. The prothonotary, under Section 1 of the
act, then prepares the bond instead of the sheriff as under the o'd practice, 28 relieving the latter from the "very
harsh rule that the sheriff should be held responsible for
what he could not possibly foresee, and what may happen
afterwards, notwithstanding the greatest foresight, ' 2 and
the -hardship of the old rule was one of the reasons for the
enactment of this statute of 1901.80
Section 6. This bond is s'gned by the person applying
for the writ of replevin with the surety.
"The surety's
nsme need not appear in the body of the bond. Its execution by him is sufficient because the act merely provides
that he shall execute and file 'such bond'..... with security
in double the value.""1 And if there be any irregularities
in the body or caption of such bond, this2 is cured by the
proper indorsement by the prothonotary.1
Section 7. This bond, under the first section of the
act, is always a condition precedent before any writ of
replevin shall issue, 88 as was the cuotom under the prior
practice," and must be renewed with every alias or pluries
writ.8 5
26
Sprague
27

Electric Co. v. Perely, 54 Pitts. L. J.230 (1906).
Gibbs v. Bartlett, 2 W. & S. 27 (1841).
Oxley v. Cowperthwaite, 1 Dall. 349 (1788); Pearce v. Humphreys, 14 S. & R. 23 (1825); Watterson v. Puelhart, 169 Pa. 612 (1895).
28

29

Watterson v. Fuelhart, Supra Note 28.
Hill v. Mervine (No. 1), Supra Chapt. 1-Note 14.

80

O1Smith v. Stakulsky, Supra Note 23.
32
Smith v. Stakulsky, Supra Note 23.

8sPickering v. Yeates, Supra Chap. 1, Note 8.
4

Baird v. Porter, 67 Pa. 105 (1870); Watterson v. Fuelhart, Supra
Note 28; Taylor v. Adams Express Co., 9 Phila. 272 (1873).
35
National Cash Reg. Co. v. Wilmore, 11 Dist. 65 (1902); S. C.,
27 County 464; S. C., 4 Lane. Jur. 60; 8 Northampton 400.
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Section 8. The filing of the bond does not vest the
title in the plaintiff 86 as under the old practice. 7
Section 9. Prior -to the Act of 1901 a foreign plaintiff, -in addition to the bond, had to 'give security for
coots."' But it is doubtful whether this additional security
is necessary under -theAct of 1901 as the bond is particularly conditioned upon the payment of "all legal costs." Perhaps this additional security -was required because of the
uncertainty of the fact as to whether a replevin -bond was
necessary under the Act of 1705.1' But since this uncertainty is now set at rest, it is reasonable to suppose that
the original replevin bond is all that is necessary from a
It would seem absurd to require -two
foreign plaintiff.
separatle bonds to secure a single incident.
Section 10. The bond is "in double the value of the
goods sought to be replevied" whether it be to determine
the right to or title to possession of personal property, or,
in distress for rent under the Act of 1772; for a landlord
cannot distrain upon household effects more in value than
the actual -amount of ,the rent due.10
Section 11. The condition of the bond is that the
plaintiff -maintain his "title" to such goods and chattels.
And 'tle" in this act has been construed -to mean title
-absolute or qualified. That is:
"In order to make the act consistent throughout, it
would appear that wherever the word 'title' occurs, in the
act, the terms includes within its meaning, a qualified
property in or right of possession, if that is the real question at issue."'
And 'by the same authority:
"'Title' must be construed in the broad sense of the
word wherein -the question of title is the moving cause, giv36

Schuckers v. Schuckers, 21 Dist. 608, (1912).

"TFrey v. Leeper, 2 Dallas 13 (1791).

"8 Jackson & Gross, "Landlord and Tenant", par. 777, sec. 2.
8409Balseley v. Hoffman, Supra Chapt. 1, Note 12.

Weaver v. Lawrence, Supra Note 17.
41Von Moschzskir, J. in Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Du Bell, 15 Dist.
883 (1906).
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ing rise to the controversy and the main issue to be tried
and determined on the pleadings provided for in this act.""
And in a similar vein, McConnell, J. said:
"'Title' as used in this -actcomprehends title to possession of the chatteds as to any qualified property therein as
well as unqualified ownership thereof.""
Section 12. "Title to such goods and chattels" has
been construed to include documents evidentiary of such
title,44 and this only to personal property and not when
such documents involve the title to real estate, 5 though it
46
does apply for the recovery of a lease.
Section 13. This sustaining of title appears to be the
sole condition of the bond. This thought is strengthened
by Section VII of the act where the Legislature, after
enumerating the alternate remedies accorded to the successful party, treated -the suit on the bond as an added
and distinct remedy, separate and apart from the other,'
by saying:
"Or he may sue in the first instance upon the bond
given and recover thereon the vakue of the goods and chattels, damages and costs, in the ame manner that recovery
is had upon other official bonds."
As an added proof that the bond given is limited to
the sole condition "to maintain title," we have the Act of
April 14, 1905, P. L. 163 which compels the plaintiff to
give an additional bond for the cost and maintainance of
impounding the property. Especia:ly is this true, when we
note -that under the old practice, the requirement of such
a bond was doubted,' 8 wherefore its conditions were un4Rosenfeld v. Goldberg, Supra Chapt. 1, Note 5.
48
Davis v. Nipple, 22 Dist. 1043 (1913).
4 4 Reber v. Schroeder, 221 Pa. 162 (1908).
45Smithson v. Johnson, 27 Dist. (1914).
4
6Clark v. Nevell, I Phila. 19 (1850).
"Similar to the prio: pracfice-8ihell v. Huinmell, 1 Pears. 19

('.853).

4Balseley v. Hoffman, Supra Chapt. 1, Note 12.
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settled, 49 and we would assume that the Legislature in
framing this remedial statute, would have been particular
-tohave specifically remedied such uncerta'nties in the bond,
by definitely prescribing the condition or conditions to
be therein stipulated.
Section 14. It b questionable whether a mere "lienor" can maintain replevin, as he cannot enter a bond under
this act to "maintain his title," because he has no property
of any kind in the goods or chattels to be replevied. 0 Prior
to the Act of 1901 ; "ldenor" could have maintained relrevin but not by virtue of an inherent right--qual'ified
or absolute-in the goods themselves, but by reason of the
peculiar contractual relationship between the parties.5 1
Again, a'nce the replevin bond was not a definite requirement prior to the Act of 1901," a plaintiff was not necessarily restrioted to maintain his "title" to such goods and
chatels; it was sufficient that he maintain his lien. Therefore, the earlier cases permitting a lienor to maintain replevin are not authorities under the Act of 1901. For it
will be asked, how can a lienor maintain replevin when he
cannot qualify as to the bond, a condition precedent "before any writ of replevin shall issue?" The case of FOX
MAGAW," though -it arose subsequent to the enactment
of 1901, was decided in reliance upon the earlier cases of
YOUNG v. KIMBALL,5" and CORBETT v. LEWIS,55 and
is, therefore, not an authority for the principle that a
"lienor" can institute replevin under the Act of 1901. In
Young v. Kimball,5 6 Lowrie, J. specifically said:
'.

4

9Weaver v. Lawrence, Supra Note 17; Chaffee v. Sangston,
Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 13; Gibbs v. Bartlett, Sapra, Note 27.
"°Young v. Kimball, 23 Pa. 193 (1854); Shoreley v. Hub Machine
Co., 23 Dist. 364 (1914).
1
" Young v. Kimball, Supra, Note 50.
"Balseley v. Hoffman, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 12.
',12 Dist. 53 (1903).
51
Yo-.ng v. Kimball, Supra, Note 50.
"Corbett v. Lowis, Supra. Nowo 53.
5
OWilliams v. Williams, 18 Dist. 988; S. C., 11 Del. Co, 1; S. C.,
22 York Leg. Rec. 146.
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"The right of a Men for the keeping of several horses
of the same person at the same time is a charge, not against
the -horses and itherefore several and divided but against
the owner, secured by a lien upon all the horses and therefore joint and several and one -horse may be detained for
the keeping of all."
Thus the lienor's rig lt is primarily against the owner
and not inherent or qualified in the goods or chattels themselves.
Section 15. Aside from the stipulation in the replevin bond, the parties to a reple-Vin proceeding are not
restricted. It may include proceedings between husband
and wife,5 7 and is apparently the proper procedure between
them,5 8 though the unity of persons between them is not
destroyed." A foreign corporation, even though it be unregistered, may maintain replevin. 0
Section 16. It is further provided in the bond that
upon failure to maintain such title, the plaintiff "shall pay
to the parties thereunto entitled, the value of such goods
and chattels." And such value -is not necessarily controlled by the amount stipulated in the affidavit of value,6 1
6 2

or in the dedlaration.

Section 17. And dn the same contingency, the bond
provides ifor the payment in addition to "all legal costs,
fees," sustained "by reason of the issuance of such writ
of -replevin," apparently attorney's fees, as fees have been
def.ned to be "compensation to an officer for services rendered in the progress of the cause; ' ' 65 but such fees could
57 McDonald v. McDonald, 38 County 268 (1911).

8
" North v. Storage Co., 56 Sup. 267 (1914). But Compare Act of
March 27, 1913, P. L. 14.
59
Duroth Mfg. Co. v. Cauffield, 243 Pa. 24 (1914).
6
ODe Clemente v. Lustig, Supra, Note 25; Selig Polyscope Co. v.
Swaab,
Supra Note 18.
6
1Fisher v. Whoolery, Supra, Note 25; Schofield v. Ferrers, 46 Pa.
488 (1884); Krumbhaar v. Stetler, 20 Phila. 341 (1891).
62Gibson, J., in Musser v. Good, 11 S. & R., 247 (1824).
63Shoemaker v. Nesbitt, 2 Rawle 201 (1828).
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not have been recovered prior to the Act of

183
1901.64

It

would be advisable, therefore, -to insert a clause in the instrument of bailment, providing for a certain per eentum
"for counsel fees in case it is necessary to institute replevin
proceedings for such goods or chatels.
Section 18.
The bond also provides for damages,
which indludes everything the defendant may have lost
through the wrongful detention, 5 so as to allow him to
be compensated in full for his loss.

6

Thus in replevin

for the recovery of vhares of stock, the court permitted the
plaintiff to recover the dividends that accrued pending the
dispositon of legal proceedings. 67 But it must be an actual loss suffered and not mere conjecture.6 8 In many instances exemplary damages are permitted in replevin, 6 9
in which the jury may assess the damages beyond the value
of the property," especdally where there is an element of
"outrage" or "oppression;" 71 and such "outrage" or "oppression" need not be specificaly averred in the declaration.7" But consequential damages not necessarily or naturally resulting from the tortious act, must be specia 'ly alleged."7
The replevin bond may also contain a
Section. 19.
clause confessing judgment as it does not enlarge the obligation but merely facilitates its enforcement, 7 4 though the
replevin bond in distress proceedings was exrpessly pro6 4Comm. v. Schroeder, Supra, Note 1, Chapt. 1.
65
Pure Oil CD. v. Terry, 209 Pa. 403 (1904).
66
Comm. v. Schroeder, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 1.
G'Pure Oil Co. v. Terry, Supra, Note 65; Armstrong v. City, 23

Dist. 62 (1914).
68Cummings v. Gann, 52 Pa. 484 (1866); Cox v. Burdett, 23 Sup.
146 (1903).
69
Warner v. Augenbaugh. 15 S. & R. 1.
"OCox v. Burdett, Supra, Note 68.

7lSchofield v. Ferrers, Supra, biote 61.
72Id.
7-3Chrk v. Mrorss, 142 Pa. 311 (1891).

74Id.
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bibited from containing such confession of judgment by the
Act of 1772.75
Section 20.
Under the eighth section of the Act of
1901, "the prothonotary shall, in the first instance, file the
amount of bail and approve or reject the security offered."
So if he accepts a married woman's bond and this is unquestioned by the opposing party, such bond will not be
stricken off after judgment is entered for want of an affidavit of defense. 7 6
But this decision must be confined
within its own narrow limits for the court intimated that
the question could only have been raised upon a rule to
open judgment and not on a rule to strike off when everyfthing appeared perfectly regular upon the face of the rec77
ord.
Section 21. The filing of -the bond "in the first -instance," has been construed to mean that the prothonotary's authority is limited to the replevin .bond as that is
the bond filed in the first -instance. Section one of the
Act of 1901 does not, in express terms, limit the prothonotary's duty to the relevin bond, and the eighth section
of the same act does not metion and particular case wherein the prothonotary's authority may be exercised, "in the
first instance."
Therefore, it would follow that the
eighth section of the act is an explanation of the prothonotary's duties generally, and that he shal] "in the
first instance"7 in every case, where bail is presented,
file and approve or reject the security offered.
Section 22. "A proper priactice under the provision of the act would be for any party dissatisfied with
the amount of the bond or the sureties thereon, to file
his exception in the first instance -with the prothonotary and have him accord the party complaining a hear"5Rehm v. Askew, 13 Dist. 353 (1904); 20 Lane. 395; 5 Lack. Jur.
142.

76
Compared. Aikey
77

v. Aikey, 28 D. R. 1023 (1914), 71 Leg. 714.
See Section 36 seq. under "Counter-Bond."
78
McIlvaine, P. J.in Hogg v. Oil Co., 17 Dist. 118 (1908); 54 Pitts.
I. J. 448; 10 Del. County 293. For the substitution or revision of
bail bonds see Act of March 19, 1803, P. L. 40.
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ing. If he dispose of the matter satiffactorily -to both
parties and his decision is complied with, that is the end
of the matter; if either party is dissatisfied he can take
an appeal to the court to have ,the order of the prothonotary revised.""
CHAPTER 3
THE WRIT OF REPLEVIN
Section 23. After the bond is properly executed
arid filed, the prothonotary issues the writ of replevin.'
This writ also contains a summons to defendant,2 or
party in possession of the goods and chattels in controversy,' to appear personally, "the summons to the defendant being necessary and subordinate, so far as respects the frame of the writ,"' without it thereby assuming the usual attributes of a summons.'
Section 24. This writ of replevin is handed to the
sheriff, who proceeds to execute it,always occompanied
by a representative of the plaintiff to identify the property named in the writ and about to be replevied. Th
sheriff can enter defendant's premises, if necessary,
within reasonable limits, to execute the wet without be7
ing considered a trespasser.
Section 25. The writ of replevin may be served by
the sheriff in the county in which it is issued:
(a) By taking possession of the goods and chattels described therein and by serving the defendant, if
found, as in the case of a summons, and by adding to the
record and serving as in the case of a summons, any
'Pickerig v. Yeates, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 8.

3Weaver v. Lawrence, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 17.
8English v. Dalbrow, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 17; Lawall v. Lawall,
1504 Pa. 626 (1892).
Baldwin v. Cash, 7 W. & S. 425 (1844).
5Ogilbie v. Bennett, 1 County 575 (1886).
MKneas v. Fitler, 2 S. & R. 263 (1816).
rId.
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other person than the defendant who may be found in
possession of such goods and chaittels, or any of them, or
(b) If the goods and chattels cannot be found, then
by serving the writ as in the case of a summons, in
which event the cause shall proceed with the same effeat as if a summons in trespass has been duly served;
and alias and pluries wirts may issue in the same suit
at 'any time prior to the verdict and said goods and chattels may be taken by virtue thereof, with the same effect as if taken on the criginal writ."
Section 26. These methods of serving the wrt of replevin are repeated in the second and ninth sections of
the Act of 1901, and is an adoption of the prior practice.9
Section 27. The sheriff has seventy two hours from
the time when the writ is served within wh'ch to remove
the goods, either physically or symbolicary, such perod
of time be'ng allowed for his possession under section III
of the Act of 1901.1'
Section 28. The service of the writ may be accepted
on behalf of the -defendant or party in possession," as under the old practice,"2 or a general appearance may waive
the service of the writ."
Section 29. "If the defendant has been duly summoned and does not appear at the return day of the writ,
the plaintiff, after having filed his .deearation, may enter a
common appearance for the defendant and proceed dn ithe
cause as in other cases." This is a reiteration of the old
Philadelphia County rule of court as set down in the old
8

Service Act of July 9, 1901 P. L. 614 (Section" 9.)
Weaver v. Lawrence, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 17; Baldwin v. Cash,
Supra, Note 4; English v. Dalbrow, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 17.
9

"Caulk v. White, 5 Lack. Jur. 1 (1904).
"Id.
"2English v. Dalbrow, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 17.
3

" Miller v. Warden, 111 Pa. 300 (1886).
142

Miles 172 (1837).

"5Crofut v. Chichester, 3 Phila. 457 (1859).

160gilbie v. Bennett, Supra, Note 5.
17Schreck v. Brittles, 19 Dist. 734 (1910); S. S. 37 County 227.
""Anthony v. Rife, 6 Dauphin 203 (1903).
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case of Lynd v. Benjamin. 1
It seems that no judgment
could be entered for want of an appearance in replevin, 5
as it is not within the purview of the Act of June 13,
1836.16
Section 29a. By the second section of the act, the
sheriff can add to the writ, the name of the party ac•tually in possession of the chattels, though not originaily
named in said writ. There is a clause -in the writ commanding the sheriff to serve the party in possession as
well as -the defendant ordginally named in the wrlt.,
Section 30. The adding of the name of 'the party
in possession as party defendant -to the record, by the sheriff, does not make sudh a party a joint defendant in these
proceedings; 1 7 thus he acquires a wider privilege than that
accorded to a joint defendant at common law." But if a;
party is impleaded as a party defendant to the record by
any methods other than those prescribed dn the Act of
1910, partictilarly by an act on the part of the plainiff himself, such defendant, however, becomes a joint defendant,
and a release of one is a release of all."
Section 31. If 'there is any other person that claims
the goods in controversy who is neither an original defendant on 'the writ, nor in possession of the goods and chattels, he may file a petition to intervene as under the earlier practice.2 0 But only upon condition that he first fi.e
an affidavit "that the 'goods and chattels so replevied belong to him."2
CHAPTER IV.

COUNTER BOND
Section 32. After the writ is properly served and the
nroperty is restored to the plaintiff, the defendant or in,tervenor, may file a counter bond so as to retain posses19 Schreck v. Brittles, Supra, Note 17.
20Lawall v. LawaU, Supra, Note 3.
2'Pickering v. Yeates, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 8; Anthony v. Rife,
Supra, N~ote 18.
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sion of the property so replevied. It 'has been decided that
the original defendant in the writ must aso :ile an affiiavit of ownership, as a condition precedent 'to the filing
of the bond,' but, as possession is always considered prima
facie evidence of ownership, - dt follows, then, that the affidavit of ownership in such case is superfluous.
Section 33. This counter bond is the old property
bond,3 considerably enlarged in its scope,' not having been
definitley prescribed by statute prior to this enactment.5
In its legal import it is eqiuvalent to the replevin bond, 6
as it is given "in the same amount as the original bond and
7
with like conditions," and must contain surety.
Section 34. Since the conditions of the coun"er bond
are similar to the replevin bond, namely, to maintain title,
it follows that neither a defendant landlord,' nor a mere
lienor can file such cla'm property bond,' for the reason
that 'ithe landlord's claim is inconsistent with ownership.
He acquires a lien upon the tenant's goods and a right to
sell them, but not a property right-general or speo'al ;,11
and a lienor, "because he has no property of amy kind in
the thing replevied, his lien for repairs is perfefy protected by the replevin bond, which by section 8 of the act
,s placed under the full, direction of the court and may
'
easily be guarded against present or -futureinsufficiency."
Section 35. Where the lower court refused to strike
off a landlord's counter bond, this was affirmed by the
'Anthony v. Rife, Supra, Chapt. 3, Note 18.
2Lehman v. Gill, 12 Dist. 89; S. C. 19 Lane. 279.
sPickering v. Yeates, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 8; Comm. v. King, 13
Dist.4 404 (1905).
Comm. v. Schroeder, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 1.
5Chafee v. Sangston, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 13; Hill v. Mervine
(No. 1), Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 14.
6
Comm. v. Schroeder, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 1; Shorley v. Hub
M!achine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
7Hill v. Mervine (No. 1), Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 14.
8Pickering v. Yeates, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 33.
9Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
Anthony v. Rife, Supra, Chapt. 3, Note 18.
"Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
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Superior Court on .the ground that such order was merely
intelocutory, and, therefore, premature for an. appeal.1"
This decision was apparently influenced by the Amendment to this section by the Act of April 14, 1905.'"
Section 36. Section 3 of the Act of 1901 says that
the counter bond should be filed without zpecifically naming the depository, and this has been construed to mean
that such counter bond cannot be fided with the prothonotary, -the court emphasizing the requirement of the 8th
section which allows the prothonotary to pass upon the
bail only "in the first instance," namely the replevin bond.
The counter bond, therefore, could only be filed with the
sheriff 4 as in the prevailing practice. The question immediately arises how can the older practice apply when
there was no such definite practice," and it was this vagueness as one of the reasons that led to the passage of the
Act of 1901."1
As an authority for the proposition that
'the counter bond is filed with the sheriff," the court cites
the case of Watterson v. Fuelhart. 8 This is error, as a carefui reading of the opinion in that case will show that the
rule of law that applied to the replevin bond had never
been sanctioned as applying to the counter bond, for there
"The cases cited in suits on
the court expressly says:
replevin bonds are not necessarily applicable to the claim
property bond."
Therefore, it woifd be more reasonable to suppose
that since the legislature intended the right of the defendant to be equalized with that of the plaintiff--"the claim
property bond is virtually a counter writ of replevin"' !)
and the law of replevin to be uniform throughout, the
practice relating to this counter bond should be similar to
12 Singer v. Pintzuk, 53 Sup. 43 (1913).
"P. L. 163.
' 4 Hill v. Mervine (No. 1), Supra, Chapt. 19 Note 14.
'5 Chaffee v. Sangston, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 13.
v. Mervine -(No. 1) Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 14.
lRflI
"Id.
28 Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 28.
I'Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 34.
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the original replevin bond, and, accordingly, -it should be
filed wiLh the prothonotary. "
Section 37. The filing of a counter bond does not
vest the title to the goods and chattels -inthe defendant,2 1
as it did under the old practice,2 but ho!ds such title in
abeyance during the pendency of the action . "
Section 38. If there be any doubt as to the identification of the property, the filing of a counter bond individuates such property."
Section 39. The counter 'bond must be filed within
seventy-two hours from the service of the writ of replevin,25 thus definitely limiting the time of the prior practice
in which the defendant was allowed a reasonable time to
find security; 2 6 and, during the seventy-two hour period,
the goods and chatt
als
,re in the possession of the sheriff. 7
But if the goods or chattels have not been removed, either
physically or symbohcally, by the sheriff before the expiration of the said seventy-two hours, ,then the defendant
will be regarded as ,in peaceful possession of the same and
no counter bond is necessaxsy.2 8
Section 40. The act -further provides that the seventy-two hour limit within which the counter bond must be
filed, may be extended by -the court "upon cause shown,"
rud, this has been construed to mean that the cause can
r ny be shown during the said seventy-two hour period,2"
thereby placing a restriction upon the defendant that did
not exist prior to the Act of 1901,"0 and not expressly pro20

See Sec. 21, Supra.

21

Schuckers v. Schuckers, 21 Dist. 608 (1912).
Stewart v. Wolf, 7 At. 165 (1886).
2
8Schuckers
v. Schuckers, Supra, Note 20.
2
22

4Rauch v. Morris, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 19.

25

Lunneman v. Lunneman, 11 Dist. 759 (1902); S. C., 27 County 657; S. C., 19 Montg. L. R. 148.
26Hocker v. Sticker, 1 Dall. 225 (1787); Pearce v. Humphreys,

Supra,
Chapt. 2, Note 28.
27
Caulk v. White, Supra, Chapt. 3, Note 10.
2SId.
29
Sickel
20

v. Gamble, 21 Mont. 171 (1905).
Pearce v. Humphrey, Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 28.
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vided for in this act. And this, notwithstanding the fact
that the defendant's rights are eniarged under the counter
Qcnd,"' for he now occupies the same position as the plainifi hirn.-ef under the original replevin bond.2 If the de"endant under seat-ion 7, is entitled to a return of the property upon a successful conclusion of the ease, why may he
not have possession of the property during the pendency
of the proceedings, especially since the title during the entire time is held in abeyance?" 3 To deny this privilege of
possessing himself with this property after seventy-two
hours, is to deny defendant an equal right with the pla:ntiff
contrary to the letter and spirit of the act.8" Therefore,
*n view of 'the -fact that the older practice allowed a w:der
.ange of time, and -that the defendant's rights were still
further augmented by the Act of 1901, in the absence of
any express provision in this section of the act inconsistent with older practice, the only reasonable inference as to
the intent of the legislature to beassumedbytheseventy-two
hour limit provided for in this section of the act, would
be, that the Legislature intended to state a definite tim.
within which ithe counter bond should be filed-no such
defimite time being provided for in the earlier practice 8 5 save, where peculiar circumstances of the case would equitably entitle such a defendant a still longer time. And it is
difficult 'to understand why such exigency should be limited to seventy-two hour period merely. If time should be
extended "upon cause shown," such may be shown whenever it may arise as an equitable exigency. That the Legislature intended this proviso to be administered in accordance with equitable principles is further evidenced by the
Amendment of this section by the Act of April 14, 1905, P.
B1Comm.
82

v. Schroeder, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 1.
Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
BsSchuckers v. Schuckers, Supra, Note 20.
34
ComM. v. Schroeder, Supra, Chapt. 1, Note 1; Shoreley v.
Hub Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
35
Chaffee v. Sangston, Supra, Chapt. 1, 14ote 13.
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L. 183 which "d)early usurped all equity powers where the
return of the specific chattels is involved." 3 6
Section 41. The Amendment of April 14, 1905, P. L.
183 provides for the impounding of the property in the
custody of the sheriff, where the property has peculiar
extrinsic value, a clear usurpation of all equity powers,
where the return of the specific chattel is involved, so that
now a bi7l in equ,.ty is no longer permissible for the return
of the specific property. 7 The plaintiff, however, is compelled to give a bond for the cost of maintainance during
the time the goods or chattels are impounded.
86 Shorley v. Hub Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
French v. Carson et al. 23 Dist. 774 (1914); Shorley v. Hub
Machine Co., Supra, Chapt. 2, Note 51.
37
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MOOT COURT
HILLARY v. BANK
Banking-Certificate of Deposit a Mere Receipt for Money-Par
ment of Interest
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A, buying land of Hillary, the price of which was $4000, and
there being a lien apparently on the land, it was agreed that A
should pay the $4000 into the bank until the removal of the lien, and
then the bank should pay it to Hillary.
A year elapsed, when
a decree of the court adjudging the supposed lien invalid was obtained. The bank on demand paid Hillary the $4000, but refused to
pay any interest, although it had issued to him an ordinary certificate
of deposit, which however, said nothing about interest.
This is an action of assumpsit in which the plaintiff seeks to
recover interest at 3 per cent., the ordinary rate paid by the bank
on deposits at interest.
Fineberg for plaintiff.
Howard for defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
ROYAL, J. In 6 Cyc. 728, we find this definition of a certificate of deposit: "A written acknowledgment by a bank or banker
of the receipt of a sum of money on deposit, which the bank or banker promises to pay to the depositor, to the order of the depositor, or
to some other person or his order." As to whether such a certificate is a mere receipt for money or in effect a promissory note, the
different jurisdictions are not in accord.
That it is the latter, and not a receipt for money, has been held
in a long line of decisions in many states, among which we note:
Citizens Bank v. Brown, 40 Ohio 39 (1887), and the cases reported
in 35 Cal. (1868); 47 Wis. 555 (1879); 87 Ind. 238 (1862); representing the latest holding on this question in the respective jurisdictions. In the first case cited, the court states: "The certificate
is in effect a promissory note. It possessed all the requisites of a
negotiable promisory note." The certificate was exactly similar
to the one the bank gave to the plaintiff in the case at bar. There
was nothing said about interest, and the court awarded interest only
from the date of the demand for the principal and the refusal to pay
it over. No interest was allowed for the time the money was in
the bank before it was demanded, and the interest given was in the
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nature of damages for the refusal to hand over the sum deposited
'when demanded.
It is to be observed that in all the citations noted above, the
definition of a certificate of deposit as a promissory note, was in
litigation where the question of negotiability of the paper was the
chief point at issue. And this has been the ease practically in
every instance that this statement has been made. We are unable
to find any cases which hold that such a certificate of deposit as
we are considering is only another form of a promissory note. What
has been held, is that it simply resembles a note as to its negotiability. Under this consideration we are unable to agree with either
of the learned counsels in this case, when they appear to treat the
certificate as a promissory note in all respects and use the terms
interchangeably.
Regardless of what other jurisdictions have held on this point,
this state has steadfastly maintained that a certificate of deposit is
merely a receipt for money. Patterson v. Poindexter, 6 W. & S.
227; Charley v. Dulles, 8 W. & S. 353; Gillespie v. Mather, 10 Pa.
28; Lebanon Bank v. Mangan, 28 Pa. 452 (No interest stated); Loudon Savings Fund Society v. Hagerstown Say. Bank, 36 Pa. 498.
And as the learned court remarks very wisely in 28 Pa. 452, "When
a -rinciple of Pennsylvania law has been settled by the Supreme
Court of the state, it is not to be changed in order to conform to
the laws of other states." The case at bar must be decided in conformity with the principles of law as laid down in this state. In
Shute v. Pac. Nat. Bank, 136 Mass. 487, this view of a certificate of
deposit is also taken, and a distinction between it and a promissory
note is advanced. "Such a certificate," we read, "is not merely
a promise to pay a certain sum, but it declares that a certain sum
has been deposited which is payable to the depositor, or his order,
on the return of the certificate properly indorsed."
All that Hillary held ,bythe transaction in this present instance,
was a receipt for $4000, which the "bank had issued to him on an
ordinary certificate of "deposit"
The relation which existed between him and the bank was that which exists under any ordinary
deposit, i. e., debtor and creditor. "An ordinary deposit of money
in a bank creates the relation of debtor and creditor."
Hale on
"Bailments and Carriers, pg. 40, and Sistare v. Best, 92 N. Y. 7, 9:
Phoenix v. Risley, 111 U. S. 125.
This being so, and there being no stipulation as to interest, we
are unable to see how the plaintiff can recover. All he was entitled
to was the principal which the bank paid over to him upon demand
as they were required to do. "Interest is not recoverable upon a
debt except upon the presumption that the debt should have been
paid sooner or up n AN EXPRESS CONTRACT TO PAY INTER
EST". See Brainerd v. Champlain Transp. Co. 29 Vt. 154. There
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certainly was no express contract to pay interest, and there was no
presumption that the 'debt' should have been paid sooner. It was
presumed, as indeed it was actually stipulated, that the money
should be paid over to Hillary upon the removal of the lien on the
land in question. It is true that interest is often given as damages,
but the plaintiff does not ask for nor can he receive it as such. "Interest is a compensation to the creditor for a wrongful delay by
the debtor." Fleming's Estate, 184 Pa. 80. But the plaintiff might
still recover the interest he seeks on an implied contract to pay the
same. "An implied contract to pay interest arises where the circumstances of a transaction justify the inference that the parties
contracted with reference to interest." 22 Cyc. 1491. And in this
connection: "A party as a general rule is not chargeable with interest unless on his part there is a promise, express or implied, to
pay it." In re Fallon 110 Minn. 213 (1910).
We can see no circumstances in this transaction which give any
evidence of such an 'implied contract.' The money was to remain
in the bank for an indefinite time. It might be a week, a month, six
months, or a year, entirely problematical and entirely dependent upon the uncertain length of time it would take to remove the lien
which existed on the land. As a matter of fact it took a year for this
purpose, but the plaintiff has shown nothing that would lead us to
conclude that it was certain that that was the length of time the
money should remain in the bank. It was beyond a doubt the very
uncertainty of this feature of the transaction that was responsible
for the bank's giving the plaintiff 'an ordinary certificate of deposit which said nothing about interest.' Had interest been contemplated it undoubtedly would have been stated so. It is customary for banks to issue these certificates of deposit for interest, but
then there is a distinct provision that it shall be payable only if the
principal is left on deposit for a specified time. Under the features
of the transaction under consideration, the principal was liable to
be demanded at any time, and would have to be paid over. In this
respect it had a striking characteristic of an ordinary checking account in a bank, and we know of no authority which holds that interest is due on such accounts in the absence of an express contract
to that effect. It is not the custom, and even under an express
contract would be a rarity. Banks as an almost universal rule only
give interest where the principal is left with them for some stated
or certain time, or longer, and in the majority of instances also require previous notice before demand for the sum, when the amount
subject to interest is demanded by the depositor.
The bank in this case was really doing the plaintiff a favor,
with a very uncertain possibility that the $4000 would be left on
deposit long enough to compensate them for the trouble of taking
it. It was their duty to be always ready to hand the money over
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to Hillary, whenever he should be entitled to receive it, in other
words, when the lien should be removed. In Mathewson v. Davis,
191 Ill. 391 (1901), where the only duty was one of this sort, it was
held that the party was "not generally chargeable with interest."
In an early case in this state, reported in 2 Dallas (Pa.) 182, there
was no liability for interest unless there was a "neglect to pay It
(the principal) on demand."
We have gone at some length into this question which the ease
at bar presents, and given it our careful consideration, with the conclusion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the interest he
seeks, in the absence of any stipulation as to interest on the certificate of deposit which he held from the defendant. We believe
this to be in conformity with the principles of law as laid down in
this state, although we are unable to cite a specific case which presents facts exactly identical to those of the case at bar.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
"It is a well understood principle of law that interest does not
run on a contract, unless especially provided for therein, until the
time fixed for payment In other words, interest will not be allowed until the time of payment has arrived, unless especially contracted for." Booth v. Pittsburg, 154 Pa. 482.
Applying this rule it has been held that "a general bank deposit
draws no interest, unless by agreement, unless upon demand for payn.ent it is refused or unreasonably .delayed." Staibs Est. 11 super.
454. And the fact that the deposit was made under the circumstances present in this case has been held not to exempt the deposit from the application of the general rule. Dewitt v. Keystone
Nat. Bank, 243 Pa. 534; Haswell v. Farmers Bank, 26 Vt. 100;
Nor does the operCitizens Bank v. Arkansas Co., 80 Ark. 601.
ation of the general rule depend upon the negotiability or nonnegotiability of the certificate of deposit. Bolles on Negotiable Instruments 424; Breyfogle v. Beckley, 16 S. & R. 264; Norton on
Bills and Notes, 61, 76.
Judgment affirmed.
STACK v. SMITH
Landlord and Tenant-Waiver of Breach of Covenants--Liability
for Rent Upon Removal Without Consent of Landlord
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A lease of a house for three years from April 1, 1912, stipulated
that should the lessee do certain things on the premises the lease
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should be void. These things were done prior to April 1, 1914, and
the tenant Smith moved out without the consent of the landlord
Stack. This is an action for the rent for the year April 1, 1914April 1, 1915, the rent 'being payable in advance. The defense is
that the lease becoming void, Smith on moving, was not liable for
any further rent.
Savige, for plaintiff.
Setzer, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BRENNEMAN, J. The first question is whether the acts of
the tenant Smith rendered the lease void, or merely voidable. Are
we to construe the terms of the lease strictly and literally or are
we to construe them in the same manner in which the courts of this
state have been construing similar leases? The law on this point
is now well settled and defined. There has been an evolution, a
complete change in the law with respect to the interpretation of
the word void.
Originally in Pennsylvania the construction placed upon the
word void was that it immediately made the lease of no effect and
the breach of express covenants by the lessee could not be waived
by the lessor. There was no way by which the tenant could be reinstated except by a new lease. Shaeffer v. Shaeffer, 37 Pa. 525;
Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. 346.
"The doctrine of Wills v. Gas Co., 130 Pa. 122, is an innovation
or change in the law; that the parties must have presumed to have
contracted in view of the general law as it was expounded when their
engagements were formed, and to determine the legal effect of the
contract otherwise, is to impair its obligation in contravention of
the 10th section of the first article of the Federal Constitution. In
Kendrick v. Smich, 7 W. & S. 41, and in Shaeffer v. Shaeffer, 37
Pa. 525, although a condition in each case was in the interest of the
Isesor it was held that upon breach of the condition by the lessee
the lease was ipso facto absolutely void, and could not afterwards
be affirmed or continued by a subsequent recognition of tenancy on
the part of the lessor or -byany act of his, otherwise than by making
a new lease. But as said in Wills v. Gas Co., supra, the vigor of
the rule has been relaxed. In Davis v. Moss, supra, where the forfeiture was said to depend upon the terms of the instrument 'unless
there be evidence to affect the landlord, with a waiver of the
breach, like receipt of rent, or other equally unequivocal act,' in
which case the lease may be continued at the instance of the lessee.
The ruling in Davis v. Moss, supra, is the first step in the transition from the doctrine of Kendrick v. Smich, to the now well settled rule laid down in Galey v. Kellerman, 123 Pa. 491, and Wills
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v. Gas Co.
The principle is well established that where the condition appears to have, been inserted solely in the interest of the
lessor, the lease is void upon the breach if the lessor by some positive act elects tUke advantage of it." Ray v. Gas Co., 135 Pa.

~588.
The same doctrine is followed in the case of Murray's Estate,
216 Pa. 274. The latest Pennsylvania case in which this new doctrine has been followed is the case of Cape May Real Est. Co. v.
Renderson, 231 Pa. 84, in which we find the following discussion:
"The general rule is that a party cannot take advantage of his own
wrong or set up his own default to work a forfeiture of his own
contract unless the contract expressly gives him the right to do so.
While the parties may contract that on default the contract shall
become void at the option of either party yet such intent in the
zigreement must be so plain as to be unavoidable in order to sustain
such construction. Covenants that the contract shall become void,
or that the estate shall cease or terminate on failure by grantee or
lesee to pay at the time specified are not self-operating and do no+
make the contract void except at the option of the grantor or lessor," and that legal effect, no matter what form or cumulation of
words or phrases be used, can only be changed by express stipulalation that the contract shall be voidable at the option of either
party, is well settled. Cochran v. Pew, 159 Pa. 184.
Was there a waiver of the breach in the case at bar? Undoubtedly there was. The rent was payable in advance and therefor due
when this action was brought. This suit was brought by Stack torecover the rent from April 1, 1914, to April 1, 1915. The fact that
he is suing for the rent is positive evidence of waiver.
Since we have found that this lease was voidable at the option
of the lessor it follows from this that Smith the tenant was not
-llowed to say whether or not these acts constituted a breach of
covenants. Stack had the right of election, Smith had not. "The
landlord need not insist in the forfeiture although the causes of it
exist. He may, e. g., waive his right to dispossess the tenant for
the non-tpayment of rent at the appointed time." Trickett, "Landlord and Tenant," p. 403.
Considering the lease effective it is important to ascertain
whether the rent can be collected for the year in question. There
sems to be very little doubt on this point and the cases are almost
"The lease having been
all unanimous that it can be collected.
made and no obstacle existing to the lessee's taking possession according to its terms, his refraining from taking possession according to itsterms, is no defense to a suit for the rent. A lessee for a certain period cannot by abandoning the possession within the period
and tendering an apportioned part of the rent, escape from paying
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the rent for the entire period, the lessor not accepting a surrender.
Nor is it a defense that after the lessee has quit the premises within
the term, the lessor has neglected to procure another tenant." Trickett, supra, p. 142. Applying this doctrine to the case at bar Smith
cannot escape the payment of the rent. The rent was due and the
action was not prematurely brought His not occupying and the
surrender of the lease, unaccepted by Stack, are no excuse for nonpayment of the rent
"In order that the surrender shall release the tenant from further liability for rent the surrender must be accepted by the lessor." 24 Cyc. 116 (b).
A tenant who removes during the term cannot defend against
payment of rent subsequently accruing on the ground that the house
was untenantable. Moore v. Gardiner, 161 Pa. 175.
In view of the fact that the lease was voidable at the option of
the lessor and that his suit for the rent was a waiver of the breach,
we therefore hold that the plaintiff must recover the rent for the
year April 1, 1914-April 1, 1915.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
On the doing of certain things, the lease was to be "void." But,
this means it shall be voidable by the lessor, not by the lessee. The
condition was for the benefit of the former, not of the latter.
The lessor has not chosen to avoid the lease. On the contrary
he affirms its validity 'by suing for the rent for the third year due
in advance. 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant, p. 1386.
Affirmed.

